Public Knowledge’s “Blueprint” February 28, 2012
Posted by Bill Rosenblatt in Law, United States.1 comment so far
My recent review of William Patry’s book on copyright reform segues neatly into Tuesday’s announcement of the Internet Blueprint campaign by the copyleft advocacy group Public Knowledge (PK). Apparently PK has taken some grief for its vociferous objections to the SOPA and PIPA legislation, and the ACTA agreement, without coming up with alternative ideas of its own.
As PK would have everyone believe, the Internet Blueprint is intended to remedy that situation. It’s a set of ideas for copyright reform, which come complete (in true lobbyist style) with draft legislation; and it’s open to ideas for expansion.
It also has nothing whatsoever to do with the objectives of SOPA and PIPA, which — in case anyone has forgotten — were to reduce copyright infringement.
Here is a quick summary of most of the ideas in Public Knowledge’s Internet Blueprint:
- Reduce abuse of the notice and takedown system in Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) by imposing additional requirements on takedown notices and fines on bogus ones, as well as expanding the “safe harbor” granted to internet service providers under this law.
- Impose regulations on the US Trade Representative that would forbid negotiating intellectual property terms in secret (as was done in the ACTA process).
- Relax section 1201 of the DMCA by making it legal to hack DRMs for lawful uses of copyrighted material protected by them.
- Shorten copyright terms from life of the creator plus 70 years to life plus 50 years.
- Empower the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to require labeling of DRM on digital content that uses it.
- Prohibit various types of abuses of copyright law, such as deceptive warning notices and frivolous lawsuits.
- Expand Fair Use.
Nope, nothing in here about reducing infringement. Even Consumer Electronics Association CEO Gary Shapiro, while being harshly critical of the music industry and its push for SOPA and PIPA, referred to “the very real problem of Internet piracy” and called for the RIAA to work with him on solutions that are more “reasonable” than those pieces of legislation. PK’s Internet Blueprint is not about working with anyone to reduce piracy.
Furthermore, for an organization that professes to be against larding the Internet with excessive regulations, this is a very interesting list of additional regulations. For example, instead of adding qualifying conditions to DMCA 1201, why not just call for its repeal?
Public Knowledge’s home page says: “In the weeks since SOPA and PIPA, many people have been wondering ‘what now?’ Policymakers here in DC ask us a similar question — ‘[I]f you don’t like SOPA and PIPA, where are your ideas?’” Some people may have asked PK that question, but the Internet Blueprint doesn’t answer it. I think a more accurate statement is probably something like, “After the success of the SOPA and PIPA protests, we would like to see what other items on our agenda we can get the public excited about.” Connecting the Internet Blueprint with SOPA and PIPA is just disingenuous.
Of the actual ideas in the Blueprint, the abuse-curbing regulations seem sensible, and the proposed legislation on DRM labeling is unworkable — as the FTC probably knows, having looked into this issue in depth back in 2009. Otherwise, for the record, I’m not expressing opinions on PK’s ideas, except to say that in general I am not a fan of regulating technology, and I believe that the United States copyright law is already too complicated. (I am particularly not a fan of DMCA 1201, though not for the typical set of reasons — but that’s a different discussion.)
It’s a good thing to try to rally the public around actionable ideas rather than feel-good slogans. But in this case, PK is guilty of excessive opportunism — or what politicians like to call “overplaying their hand.” Just as one shouldn’t bother asking vegetarians for better steak recipes, one shouldn’t bother asking Public Knowledge for ideas on reducing copyright infringement.
Hadopi Becomes un Ballon de Football Politique February 21, 2012
Posted by Bill Rosenblatt in Europe, Law, Uncategorized.2 comments
Those of us who deal with the so-called copyright wars here in the United States can take comfort in one thing: the battles between Big Media and Big Tech have mostly avoided getting sucked into this country’s corrosive, debilitating party politics.
The “balanced copyright” movement has some alignment with leftist politics — not for nothing do many call it “copyleft” — but that’s mostly confined to academics and a handful of not-very-industry-aligned advocacy groups. Now that SOPA and PIPA are dead, the Republicans who run Congress can’t decide whether to continue to align themselves with the politically entrenched media industry and promote further legislation, or to tout individual liberties (and appease the burgeoning Big Tech lobby) and repudiate such legislation. Nobody involved in this year’s presidential election has touched the online copyright issue.
France, however, shows a completely different picture. As a recent New York Times article describes it, the Hadopi progressive response legislation has been in place for two years, warnings have been issued to consumers caught downloading illegally, and the first group of repeat offenders — 165 of them — have been handed over to the justice system for potential fines and suspension of their Internet accounts. The first warnings were sent out in October 2010, about 1-1/3 years ago.
First of all, let’s compare this with the RIAA’s campaign of individual lawsuits in the US: the RIAA appears to have gone after between 18,000 and 35,000 people over a period of five years, or 3600-7000 per year on average. Even if one allows for the fact that France has 19% of the Internet-using population of the US, the number of French Internet users thus affected by Hadopi is only 18-35% of the proportionate number of US Internet users sent nastygrams by the RIAA.
Every study of the Hadopi system that has been done so far has shown the system to be successfully reducing illegal downloading and increasing legitimate consumption of content, particularly music sales on iTunes. (The effect of the law on subscription streaming services like Deezer and Spotify hasn’t been measured.) One would expect the “usual suspects” to debunk the studies, but they haven’t. Instead, there have been statements such as “the effects are undeniable but hard to quantify” (the liberal newspaper Le Monde) and “Apparently some of its intimidation is having a psychological effect” (La Quadrature du Net, a French advocacy group which otherwise argues that Hadopi is a waste of taxpayers’ money to solve a nonexistent problem).
In other words, like it or not, the Hadopi system seems to be working so far.
French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who actively supported the Hadopi law, is up for re-election himself. As a result, online copyright has become in France what we in America call a political football. Socialists have been the most vocal enemies of the Hadopi law in France and have been calling for flat-tax statutory licenses, following the ideas of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Terry Fisher of Harvard Law School, and other copyleft figures. Yet now that the right-wing candidate Marine Le Pen is now stealing the socialists’ thunder by calling for a statutory license herself, the socialists are backing away from the idea, calling instead for some hazy combination of taxes and crackdowns on sites that enable illegal copying. Nevertheless, both anti-Sarkozy parties have professed Hadopi hatred, as both a populist gesture and a Sarkozy differentiator.
This is just a little bit crazy. Conservatives are supposed to be for individual liberties, low taxes, and small government. So what is a hard-right politician doing embracing a system that amounts to a tax on content, no matter how much each consumer uses, and that distributes money to content creators through opaque, government-entrenched entities like the collecting society SACEM? And what are the socialists, who are supposed to be for big government and equitable distribution of resources, doing opposing it? I’m sure that I, as an American, do not have a proper understanding of French politics. But to me, this smacks of political opportunism and demagoguery of the type that we are deluged with in this US election year on issues such as healthcare, taxes, gay marriage, etc., etc. It’s sad.
I think five years is a reasonable timeframe in which to judge the success of Hadopi, so it’s premature so far. Die-hard infringers will find ways around the system, such as through anonymizers, virtual private networks, and file encryption; we have yet to see how popular such methods become. The fairness and effectiveness of the enforcement and appeal mechanisms have yet to be established. But one hopes that Hadopi’s educational effect coupled with the fear of getting caught will reduce infringement enough to make it worthwhile; in that case, other countries should adopt progressive response with a strong educational component too.
Let Hadopi-haters do their own serious quantitative studies, and let’s compare the results. Let’s make the judgments on facts, and for God’s sake let’s not let political posturing pollute the atmosphere. Then let’s see the Copyright Alert System assess what’s working in Hadopi and adopt it here in the United States, where — at least for the moment — no one need worry about the issue being demagogued to death in election years.
Patry on Copyright Repair February 12, 2012
Posted by Bill Rosenblatt in Book reviews, Law.3 comments
The prolific copyright authority William Patry wrote a book in 2009, Moral Panics and the Copyright Wars, which was a jeremiad against the current copyright system along with pleas for reform — but with no ideas about how to reform it. In response to criticism, Patry promised a follow-up work that would supply the “prescription out of the current situation.” That book would be titled How to Fix Copyright, and it would come out in the beginning of 2011.
So here we are in early 2012. The book is now out. But as a prescription for how to fix copyright, it’s a disappointment.
First of all, the reader has to wade through a lot of complaints about today’s copyright system, and other redundancies to Moral Panics, to get to any suggested solutions. Furthermore, Patry — apparently against the advice of his editors — refused to create a summary that neatly lists his ideas for reform. It is true that the book contains deeper ideas that it would be unfair to reduce to list items, and I’ll get to some of these. But first, here’s a list of succinctly statable copyright reform ideas in Patry’s book:
- Reduce the term of copyright, because most works make money for their owners in the first few years after release, and after that they are best put into the public domain.
- Make copyright registration mandatory instead of automatic, so that only those who really want protection for their works can get it.
- Pass strong “orphan works” legislation, so that works whose owners won’t or can’t claim them can be enjoyed by all instead of being locked up in limbo.
- Create comprehensive global rights registries, so that copyright users can instantly tell who owns what and license works appropriately.
- Streamline the impenetrable maze of copyright licensing entities, rules and cross-border inconsistencies, so that it becomes easier to access content legally worldwide.
- Create more statutory licenses, blanket licenses, and levies, to make copyright easier to administer and rights holder compensation easier to generate.
- Price copyrighted works differently in different geographies to reflect economic realities, because people in economically challenged countries can’t possibly afford the prices for content that people in first-world countries pay.
- Change copyright law to accommodate the new breed of digital artists whose tools necessarily involve copying pieces of copyrighted material.
- Abolish legal constructs that impose or support “digital locks” on content, such as DMCA 1201, because they unfairly restrict technological development as well as Fair Use.
Go to any other established copyleft source — Lessig, Litman, Vaidhyanathan, Public Knowledge, etc. — and you’ll find much the same list. One exception, perhaps, is #7, geographically differentiated pricing (though this has little to do with copyright law per se). This has been shown to work well for physical products such as CDs: for example, Microsoft tried it for software and found its piracy rates in countries like China significantly reduced. But it’s hard to see how you make it work for pure digital content without lots of impractical cross-border enforcement implications (mandatory geolocation-based filtering, anyone?).
Now that we’ve gotten the Cliffs Notes version of this book out of the way, let’s get to the more novel and interesting ideas. First is Patry’s call for resetting goals of copyright reform so that they focus on the original objective of copyright. The original objective has been to maximize the works available to the public by providing creators incentives to create them. Changes to copyright law have often been enacted with the objective of reducing infringement and preserving revenue for copyright owners. That goal overlaps with the original one, but it’s not the same thing. He also says that future changes should be based on hard evidence that a proposed change will help achieve the objective rather than “blind faith” that it will do so. The evidence-vs.-faith argument makes great sense and is hard to argue with in principle.
Yet Patry doesn’t discuss how this could actually be implemented in the U.S.; he mainly provides the counterexample of the UK Digital Economy Bill and the lack of analysis that went into it when it was rammed through Parliament. The normal U.S. process in implementing a law that touches the business world is for lobbying groups to influence members of Congress — and in many cases, to even propose legislation drafts. In the case of copyright, Congress has a nonpartisan Copyright Office that is supposed to advise it on such matters. Patry would certainly know to what degree the Copyright Office could act as the source of the independent “impact statements” he seeks, since he worked there himself.
The Office does evaluate proposed changes to the law today, though in tightly controlled ways such as the triennial rulemaking on DMCA 1201. It does get lots of “input” from lobbyists and (as I know from my own experience) hungers for truly independent expertise. But the Office does not have the capacity to evaluate the economic, technological, and behavioral issues that come into play when judging the impact of proposed changes to the law. The European Commission’s Special Advisor program could be a model for what Patry has in mind: it hires outside experts to consult (for nominal fees) after they pass strict conflict-of-interest vetting processes.
But if the real goal of copyright is to maximize the amount of works available to the public, then it seems to me that the evidence is before us today and is so obvious as to require no studies at all. Sites like YouTube, Flickr, Scribd, and any number of free music sites offer exploding numbers of works that are supposedly covered under copyright (or some subset of copyright, such as Creative Commons licenses) and are there for promotional or non-pecuniary reasons. The numbers are huge even without the infringing material. And I suspect that most people who upload original material to these sites don’t think about copyright at all. How does this state of affairs require “reform”?
Patry discusses two other ideas that complicate his principles of reform. He insists that for copyright to do its job, content creators should be able to make livings from their work. So far, so good. He says that the current system favors major media companies, and the benefits do not “trickle down” to individual content creators. Also hard to argue with.
Yet once again, he doesn’t really describe how to fix this problem. Without explicitly tying them to the problem of compensation for individual content creators, he calls for more blanket or statutory licenses, in which licensing entities set monetary terms for content on behalf of large numbers of or “all” content creators respectively, and levies, which are taxes on hardware and blank media. All of these result in license fees that are somehow disbursed (after being reduced to cover “overhead”) to content creators through “magic black boxes” that are affiliated with or beholden to governments. Such entities — at least in their current states — are often far cries from independence and fact bases.
He also calls for global rights registries, which should make licensing and compensation fairer and more efficient. But such things would have to coexist with the collecting society (i.e. government-affiliated magic black box) system that we have today — or the latter would have to be drastically changed. This is a highly promising area of thought; unfortunately Patry doesn’t connect the dots far enough to pursue it.
The second idea in How to Fix Copyright that complicates Patry’s copyright reform principles is his foray into the dark and dangerous waters of dichotomy between “culturally important” content and “commercial trash.” Patry, a classically-trained clarinetist who commissions composers to write works for his instrument (don’t get me wrong: this is a good thing!), wants to preserve “cultural” content and has no interest in Hollywood products such as Batman 3, American Pie 4, or Miley Cyrus. In this, Patry parts company with his employer Google, whose lobbyist Derek Slater recently said, in justifying YouTube, that it’s wrong to judge content by “quality” because “one man’s trash is another man’s treasure.”
The original purpose of copyright runs into some trouble over this ambiguity: should copyright seek to maximize “what the people want” or works that meet some cultural or “quality” criteria? There must surely be some history behind this conundrum. Patry must know it from his background as law professor and textbook author, but he doesn’t share it here. If it’s the former, then it seems to me that the system is working just fine as is. The major media companies are expert in recognizing and satisfying popular demand, even if they do less and less work in creating the actual content. And for those who aren’t interested in big-media content, there’s YouTube, SoundCloud, Scribd, and so many other sources of content that doesn’t even cost anything.
But if the purpose of copyright is really to maximize “quality” or “cultural” works, then what about creating (and properly funding) a Department of Culture and a cabinet-level Secretary to run it — thereby putting the United States on par with most other developed countries? Patry stops short of recommending this, but he tends in that direction by calling for “direct funding [of] diverse cultural works” (i.e. patronage), expressing admiration for crowd-funding entities like Kickstarter, and generally appearing to see “marketing” as an egregious form of corporate mass hypnosis.
The final big idea in Patry’s book that merits discussion is his treatment of Fair Use. Patry spends an entire chapter singing the praises of Fair Use as a deliberately vague and conceptual construct. He takes an expansive view of Fair Use that is seemingly at odds with Larry Lessig’s position that it is a “wedge” between legal use and infringement that has been overloaded in the digital age. It’s also, as I’ve said many times, at odds with digital reality today.
Patry contrasts U.S. Fair Use with the Fair Dealing system used in the UK, Canada, and Australia, and with the similar scheme implemented through the European Union Copyright Directive. He calls those systems “closed list” systems because they codify uses of content that aren’t infringement (such as parody and criticism) rather than using the “open-ended” concepts found in U.S. law. He says, “Critics of the U.S. fair use doctrine point to the alleged ‘open-ended’ nature of fair use and argue that it lacks certainty.” Yep, it sure does. Fair Use’s lack of certainty makes it impracticable in the digital age as never before. Lessig has said that Fair Use is really just the right to hire a lawyer; Patry either doesn’t agree or doesn’t care.
This attitude that the copyright systems’ efficacy should be based on laws as written, and as executed by lawyers, governments, and government-sanctioned entities, pervades How to Fix Copyright. In other words, not only is the book short on implementation recommendations, but it also doesn’t look far enough outside the system to determine how to fix it. In his previous book, Patry had the temerity to suggest that “perhaps the answer to the machine is in the machine,” referring to Google’s use of fingerprint-based copyright filtering technology as an effective way of reducing piracy and monetizing content on YouTube. But in How to Fix Copyright, he spends an entire chapter recanting this statement. This chapter that contains so much rhetorical contortion (not to mention misunderstandings of technology and the market) that I bet it’s the result of Patry’s copyleft colleagues giving him grief about what he said last time.
And that’s the biggest problem I personally have with this book. The route to getting many content creators paid is neither through big-government “magic boxes” nor through laws that are for all intents and purposes unenforceable without technology or unless you can afford to both hire a good lawyer and wait until the litigation or negotiation is over. I don’t disagree that the copyright system needs reforming, but the original ideas for reform in this book have questionable practical value without plausible explanations of how they might actually work.
William Patry is a highly learned and respected figure in copyright with depth and breadth of interests that do him credit; his writing is articulate, well-researched, and persuasive. One can certainly read similar enumerations of copyleft ideas from other sources that are more shallow, strident, doctrinaire, and/or uninformed. But in the end — and unlike in copyright — the ideas matter more than the expression, and in How to Fix Copyright, the ideas underwhelm.
Who’s Subsidizin’ Who? February 9, 2012
Posted by Bill Rosenblatt in Business models, Music, Publishing, Services, Uncategorized, United States.add a comment
Barnes & Noble has just announced a deal offering a US $100 Nook e-reader for free with a $240/year subscription to the New York Times on Nook. Meanwhile, MuveMusic, the bundled-music service of the small US wireless carrier Cricket Wireless, passed the 500,000 subscriber mark last month. MuveMusic has vaulted past Rdio and MOG to be probably the third largest paid subscription music service in the United States, behind Rhapsody and (probably) Spotify at over a million each.
MuveMusic isn’t quite a subsidized-music deal a la Nokia Ovi Music Unlimited, but it does offer unlimited music downloads bundled with wireless service at a price point that’s lower than the major carriers. (The roaming charges you’d incur if you leave Cricket’s rather spotty coverage area could add to the cost.) Cricket is apparently spending a fortune to market MuveMusic, and it’s paying off.
It looks like the business of bundling content with devices is not dead; on the contrary, it’s just beginning. The fact that both types of bundling models exist — pay for the device, get the content free; pay for the content, get the device free — means that we can expect much experimentation in the months and years ahead. Although it’s hard to imagine a record label offering a free device with its music, we could follow a model like Airborne Music and think of things like, say, a deal between HTC and UMG offering everything Lady Gaga puts out for $20/year with a free HTC Android phone and/or (HTC-owned) Beats earbuds. Or how about free Disney content with a purchase of an Apple TV?
As long as someone is paying for the content, any of these models are good for content creators. device makers, ane consumers alike. Bring them on!
IFPI Claims Success of Progressive Reponse in Curbing Infringement January 30, 2012
Posted by Bill Rosenblatt in Europe, Law, New Zealand.3 comments
The International Federation for the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), the global umbrella of national music trade associations like the RIAA in the United States, published its annual Digital Music Report last week. Among the most interesting findings is results of studies of the effects of the progressive response law enacted in France in 2009.
The French Creation and Internet Law, which is referred to as “Hadopi” after the agency it created (Haute Autorité pour la Diffusion des Oeuvres et la Protection des droits sur l’Internet), is one of a handful of so-called progressive response regimes, in which ISPs in a given country are obliged to respond to complaints about file-sharing by issuing a series of increasingly stern warnings and then potentially suspending their Internet accounts or fining them.
IFPI worked with Nielsen to measure Hadopi’s effects on file-sharing in France, and found that the effect was to decrease file-sharing by 26% over the year after Hadopi’s October 2010 implementation, although the numbers have been creeping back up a bit since October 2011. IFPI’s report also published the results of a separate academic study by economists at Carnegie-Mellon University and Wellesley College that claims a net increase of 22.5-25% in paid iTunes music downloads from before to after Hadopi was implemented.
The IFPI report also cites studies that show that warning messages have an effect: a May 2011 study found that 50% of people who either received a Hadopi notice or knew someone who got one stopped their illegal file-sharing. The same measurement for South Korea, another country with progressive response in place, was 70%.
Critics of progressive response reply that P2P file-sharing has been decreasing anyway, that file-sharing is “yesterday’s problem” as copyright infringement moves from file-sharing networks to torrent sites, cyberlockers, and other places. It’s hard to argue that the reduction of 26% in French file-sharing means “piracy has decreased by 26%” (and in fact IFPI isn’t arguing that at all). Yet the graph in the IFPI report clearly indicates a drop in file-sharing activity that coincides with the deployment of Hadopi.
It’s worth bearing in mind that the vast majority of Hadopi activity is warnings, which fall under the heading of “education” instead of “technical protection measures,” because the warnings don’t actually prevent users from doing anything that they could do before.
At the same time, there is one sour note in the IFPI report: in a discussion of the graduated response system in New Zealand (which accompanied a decrease in P2P usage of 16%), rights holders complain that “the high cost of notifications to ISPs … could prevent the graduated response system being used over the long term to optimum effect.” In other words, it’s not enough to have a government-mandated requirement for ISPs to act on complaints of file-sharing; copyright owners also don’t want to have to pay to generate the complaints. I don’t know what they call this in New Zealand, but in France, Marie Antoinette might have called it “Qu’ils ont de la brioche et la manger aussi.”*
P.S. The IFPI Digital Music Report also contains the very exciting statistic that the total of paying users of music subscription services has shot up 65% over the past year to an estimated 13 million plus. That number blows by the 10 million that I thought would be reached by next September.
*”Let them have their cake and eat it too.”
Creative Commons for Music: What’s the Point? January 22, 2012
Posted by Bill Rosenblatt in Law, Music, Rights Licensing, Services, Standards.22 comments
I recently came across a music startup called Airborne Music, which touts two features: a business model based on “subscribing to an artist” for US $1/month, and music distributed under Creative Commons licenses. Like other music services that use Creative Commons, Airborne Music appeals primarily to indie artists who are looking to get exposure for their work. This got me thinking about how — or whether — Creative Commons has any real economic value for creative artists.
I have been fascinated by a dichotomy of indie vs. major-label music: indie musicians value promotion over immediate revenue, while for major-label artists it’s the other way around. (Same for book authors with respect to the Big 6 trade publishers, photographers with respect to Getty and Corbis, etc.) Back when the major labels were only allowing digital downloads with DRM — a technology intended to preserve revenue at the expense of promotion — I wondered if those few indie artists who landed major-label deals were getting the optimal promotion-versus-revenue tradeoffs, or if this issue even figured into major-label thinking about licensing terms and rights technologies.
When I looked at Airborne Music, it dawned on me that Creative Commons is interesting for indie artists who want to promote their works while preserving the right (if not the ability) to make money from them later. The Creative Commons website lists ten existing sites that enable musicians to distribute their music under CC, including big ones like the bulge-bracket-funded startup SoundCloud and the commercially-oriented BandCamp.
This is an eminently practical application of Creative Commons’s motto: “Some rights reserved.” Many CC-licensing services use the BY-SA (Attribution-Share-Alike) Creative Commons license, which gives you the right to copy and distribute the artist’s music as long as you attribute it to the artist and redistribute (i.e. share) it under the same terms. That’s exactly what indie artists want: to get their content distributed as widely as possible but to make sure that everyone knows it’s their work. Some use BY-SA-NC (Attribution-Share-Alike-Noncommercial), which adds the condition that you can’t sell the content, meaning that the artist is preserving her ability to make money from it.
It sounds great in theory. It’s just too bad that there isn’t a way to make sure that those rights are actually respected. There is a rights expression language for Creative Commons (CC REL), which makes it possible for content rendering or editing software to read the license (in XML RDFa) and act accordingly. As a technology, the REL concept originated with Mark Stefik at Xerox PARC in the mid-1990s; the eminent MIT computer scientist Hal Abelson created CC REL in 2008. Since then, the Creative Commons organization has maintained something of an arms-length relationship with CC REL: it describes the language and offers links to information about it, but it doesn’t (for example) include CC REL code in the actual licenses it offers.
More to the point, while there are code libraries for generating CC REL code, I have yet to hear of a working system that actually reads CC REL license terms and acts on them. (Yes, this would be extraordinarily difficult to achieve with any completeness, e.g., taking Fair Use into account.)
Without a real enforcement mechanism, CC licenses are all little more than labels, like the garment care hieroglyphics mandated by the Federal Trade Commission in the United States. For example, some BY-SA-licensed music tracks may end up in mashups. How many of those mashups will attribute the sources’ artists properly? Not many, I would guess. Conversely, what really prevents someone who gets music licensed under ND (No Derivative Works) terms from remixing or excerpting in ways that aren’t considered Fair Use? Are these people really afraid of being sued? I hardly think so.
This trap door into the legal system, as I have called it, makes Creative Commons licensing of more theoretical than practical interest. The practical value of CC seems to be concentrated in business-to-business content licensing agreements, where corporations need to take more responsibility for observing licensing terms and CC’s ready-made licenses make it easy for them to do so. The music site Jamendo is a good example of this: it licenses its members’ music content for commercial sync rights to movie and TV producers while making it free to the public.
Free culture advocates like to tell content creators that they should give up control over their content in the digital age. As far as I’m concerned, anyone who claims to welcome the end of control and also supports Creative Commons is talking through both sides of his mouth. If you use a Creative Commons license, you express a desire for control, even if you don’t actually get very much of it. What you really get is a badge that describes your intentions — a badge that a large and increasing number of web-savvy people recognize. Yet as a practical matter, a Creative Commons logo on your site is tantamount to a statement to the average user that the content is free for the taking.
The truth is that sometimes artists benefit most from lack of control over their content, while other times they benefit from more control. The copyright system is supposed to make sure that the public’s and creators’ benefits from creative works are balanced in order to optimize creative output. Creative Commons purports to provide simple means of redressing what its designers believe is a lack of balance in the current copyright law. But to be attractive to artists, CC needs to offer them ways to determine their levels of control in ways that the copyright system does not support.
In the end, Creative Commons is a burglar alarm sign on your lawn without the actual alarm system. You can easily buy fake alarm signs for a few dollars, whereas real alarm systems cost thousands. It’s the same with digital content. At least Creative Commons, like almost all of the content licensed with it, is free.
(I should add that I wear the badge myself. My whitepapers and this blog are licensed under Creative Commons BY-NC-ND (Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works) terms. I would at least rather have the copyright-savvy people who read this know my intentions.)
Updated DRM Reference Table Now Available January 19, 2012
Posted by Bill Rosenblatt in Uncategorized.add a comment
I have updated the GiantSteps DRM and Content Protection Reference Table that I have been maintaining for the past three years. This version updates the previous version from April 2010. The update includes updated information on over three dozen DRM, conditional access, and other content protection technologies, as well as an expanded section on independent protection technologies for PC games and software.
You can get a copy of the table in PDF (4 x 2 page layout) for free here (scroll down to the form and choose “DRM and Content Protection Reference Table (PDF)” from the dropdown menu). Or, if you would like the unprotected Excel spreadsheet, the cost is USD 300 (PayPal accepted), click here to order.
UltraViolet Gets Two Lifelines January 12, 2012
Posted by Bill Rosenblatt in Economics, Fingerprinting, Services, Standards, Video.add a comment
A panel at this week’s CES show in Las Vegas yielded two pieces of positive news for the DECE/UltraViolet standard, after a launch several months ago with Warner Bros. and its Flixster subsidiary that could charitably be called “premature.” Of the two news items, one is a nice to have, but the other is a game-changer.
Let’s get to the game-changer first: Amazon announced that a major Hollywood studio is licensing its content for UltraViolet distribution through the online retail giant. The Amazon executive didn’t name the studio, though many assume it’s Warner Bros. Even if it’s a single studio, the importance of this announcement to the likelihood of UltraViolet’s success in the market cannot be overstated.
Leaving aside UltraViolet’s initial technical glitches and shortage of available titles, the problem with UltraViolet from a market perspective had always been a lukewarm interest from online retailers. As I’ll explain, this hasn’t been a surprise, but Amazon’s new interest in UltraViolet could make all the difference.
UltraViolet is the “brand name” of a standard from a group called the Digital Entertainment Content Ecosystem (DECE), headed by Sony Pictures executive Mitch Singer. It implements a so-called rights locker for digital movies and other video content. Users can establish UltraViolet accounts for themselves and family members. Then they can obtain movies in one format (say, Blu-ray) and be entitled to get it in other formats for other devices (say, Windows Media file download for PCs). They can also stream the content to a web browser anywhere. The rights locker, managed by Neustar Inc., tracks each user’s purchases.
In other words, UltraViolet promises users format independence and a hedge against format obsolescence, while providing some protection for the content by requiring it to be packaged in several approved DRM and stream encryption schemes. It includes a few limitations on the number of devices and family members that can be associated with a single UltraViolet account, but in general UltraViolet is designed to make video content more portable and interoperable than, say, DVDs or iTunes downloads.
Five of the six major Hollywood studios (all but Disney*), plus the “major indie” Lionsgate, are participating in UltraViolet.
One of the design goals of UltraViolet was to ensure that no single retailer could attain a market share large enough to be able to control downstream economics — in other words, to avoid a replay of Apple’s dominance of digital music downloads (and possibly Amazon’s dominance of e-books). To do this, the DECE studios pushed for ways to thwart consumer lock-in by online retailers that would sell UltraViolet content.
The most important example of this is rights locker portability: users can access their rights lockers from any participating retailer. UltraViolet retailers must compete with each other through value-added features.
Amazon’s Kindle e-book scheme offers a good illustration of platform lock-in and how it differs from other features that a retailer can build or offer. If you buy an e-book on Amazon, you can download and read it on a wide variety of devices: not just Kindle e-readers but also iPads, iPhones, Android devices, BlackBerrys, PCs, and Macs — in other words, pretty much everything but other e-reader devices. You get e-book portability — it will even remember where you last left off if you resume reading an e-book on another device — but you are still tied to Amazon as a retailer. If you want to read the same e-book on a Nook, for example, you have to buy it separately from Barnes & Noble (and then you can read that e-book on your PC, Mac, iPhone, Android, etc.).
This lock-in gives Amazon power in the market as a retailer; it had 58% market share as of February 2011 (by comparison, Apple has over 70% of the music download market). UltraViolet wants to make it as difficult as possible for a single digital video retailer to assert such market power.
The downside of that policy has been a lack of enthusiasm among retailers to sell UltraViolet-licensed content — which entails significant development investment and operational expenses. A good shorthand way to evaluate the potential impact of a standards initiative is to look at the list of participants: what points in the value chain are represented, how many of the top companies in each category, and so on. In DECE’s case, members have included most of the major movie studios, plenty of consumer device makers, lots of DRM and conditional access technology vendors, and so on, but few big-name retailers… one of which (Best Buy) already had a different system for delivering digital video content via Sonic Solutions.
Warner Bros. tried to jump-start the UltraViolet ecosystem by acquiring Flixster, a movie-oriented social networking startup, adding digital video e-commerce capability, and using it as an UltraViolet retailer for a handful of Warner titles. This has been little more than a proof-of-concept test, which was plagued by some technical glitches and suboptimal user experience — all of which, according to Singer, have been fixed.
It would be unworkable for Hollywood to pin its hopes for its next big digital format on a small unknown retailer owned by one of the studios. It has been vitally necessary to attract a big-name retailer to both validate the concept and provide the necessary marketing and infrastructure footprints. There had been talk of Wal-Mart entering the UltraViolet ecosystem, although it already has its own video delivery scheme through VUDU. But otherwise, the membership list had been short on major retailers.
Of course, Amazon is the major-est online retailer of them all. And it so happens that Amazon’s digital video strategy is a good fit to UltraViolet in two ways. First, Amazon currently runs a streaming service (Amazon Instant Video), whereas UltraViolet is primarily focused on downloads, a/k/a Electronic Sell Through (EST): the idea of UltraViolet is to buy a download and only then be able to view it via streaming.
Second, Amazon Instant Video does not look particularly successful. Of course, Amazon does not reveal user numbers, but it is telling that Amazon included Instant Video Unlimited as a perk in its US $79/year Amazon Prime program… and that when people extol the virtues of Amazon Prime, they tend to emphasize the free overnight shipping but rarely the streaming video.
The biggest winner thus far in the paid online video sweepstakes is Netflix, with about 24 million subscribers as of mid-2011. Netflix’s subscription-on-demand model is most likely far more popular than Amazon Instant Video’s pay-per-view (except for Amazon Prime members) model. Thus Amazon may be looking for ways to improve its market position in video without having to hack away at the Netflix streaming juggernaut.
The video download market is in comparative infancy. It has no runaway market leader a la Netflix, or Apple in music. If this situation persists long enough, and if Amazon’s trial run with UltraViolet is successful, then other retailers might see UltraViolet as a viable format as well… precisely because it will make them better able to compete with the Online Retailing Gorilla.
Yet the other dimension of UltraViolet that is currently lacking is availability of titles. And that’s where the other CES announcement comes in. Samsung announced a “Disc to Digital” feature that it will incorporate into new Blu-ray players later this year. With this feature, users can slide in their Blu-ray discs or DVDs, and if the content is “eligible,” they can choose to have that content available in their UltraViolet rights lockers for delivery in any UltraViolet-compliant format.
The Disc to Digital feature is a collaboration between Flixster (i.e. Warner Bros.) as online retailer and Rovi as technology supplier. It works in a manner that is analogous to “scan and match” services for music such as Apple iTunes Match: it scans your DVD or Blu-ray disc, identifies the movie, and if the movie is available in the UltraViolet library of licensed content, gives you an UltraViolet rights locker entry for that movie. Rovi’s content identification technology and metadata library are undoubtedly at the heart of this scheme.
There are two catches: first, users will have to pay a “nominal” fee per disc for this service, which is even larger (and as yet unspecified) if they want it in high definition; second, it is limited to “eligible” content, and no one has offered a definition of “eligible” yet (beyond the fact that the content must come from one of the DECE participating studios). But surely the “eligible” catalog will exceed the current list (19 titles) by orders of magnitude, or the service will not be worth launching.
Nevertheless, these developments are very positive news for DECE/UltraViolet after months of embarrassments and bad press. DECE still has lots of work to do to make UltraViolet successful enough to be the major studios’ designated successor to Blu-ray, but at last it’s on track.
*Yes, I’m aware of the irony of using a tag line from “Who Wants to Be a Millionare” in the title of this article: Disney owns the home entertainment distribution rights to that hit TV game show.
New White Paper: Content Security Requirements for Multi-Screen Video Services January 9, 2012
Posted by Bill Rosenblatt in Conditional Access, DRM, Technologies, Video, Watermarking, White Papers.add a comment
I have released a new white paper on content security requirements for video services that distribute content to multiple devices. This white paper discusses copyright owners’ requirements for security in today’s world of proliferating devices and delivery channels.
So-called managed networks (cable, satellite, and telco TV) are under increasing pressure to compete with “over the top” (OTT) video services that can run on any IP-based (unmanaged) network to a variety of devices — services like Netflix and Hulu. In the US, in fact, total subscriberships of OTT services are fast approaching the total subscriberships of cable, satellite, and telco TV.
Therefore pay-TV operators have to respond by making their content available on a similar variety of devices and even through unmanaged networks. While some major pay-TV providers like Comcast and Time Warner Cable are launching “TV Everywhere” services, many more pay-TV operators are trying to keep up by building their own service extensions onto mobile phones, tablets, and home devices other than traditional set-top boxes (STBs).
Content security is one of the many requirements that operators have to meet in order to license content from studios, TV networks, sports leagues, and other major content sources. Life for pay-TV operators used to be relatively simple: adopt a conditional access (CA) technology that was equally effective in thwarting signal theft as it was in thwarting content piracy. Economic and security goals were aligned between operators and copyright owners. Now life is considerably more complicated, as operators have to support home networks and branch out into mobile services. Content security requirements are more complicated as well.
This white paper gathers security requirements from major content owners and describes them in a single document. The intent is to help pay-TV operators and other video service providers that are looking to launch multi-screen video services, so that they know what to expect and avoid any unpleasant surprises with regard to security requirements when licensing content to offer through their services.
I spoke to representatives from most of the major Hollywood studios to get their requirements. Although it is not possible to build a gigantic table that an operator can use to look up DRM or conditional access requirements for any given delivery modality and client device — among other things, such a table would become obsolete very quickly — I was able to create a set of guidelines that should be useful for operators.
Content security guidelines do depend on certain factors, including release windows (how long after a film’s theatrical release or a TV show’s first airing), display quality, and the usage rules granted to users and their devices. In the white paper, I map these factors to certain specific content security requirements, such as roots of trust, watermarks, software hardening, and DRM robustness rules. Security guidelines also depend on external market factors that the white paper also describes.
Many thanks to Verimatrix for commissioning this white paper. To obtain it, follow this link and fill out the form for a PDF download. Feel free to contact me with any questions or other follow-up.
Oblivion, But Not Beyond January 2, 2012
Posted by Bill Rosenblatt in Music, Services.16 comments
Last week, the music startup Beyond Oblivion ceased operations. The shutdown happened after three years of development and shortly before the company’s service was to go into public beta. The news was leaked to Engadget last Thursday and became “official” when it was reported in the Financial Times on Saturday.
First, the disclosure: I consulted to Beyond Oblivion throughout much of the company’s existence. I’m proud of what we did, privileged to have worked with its top-notch management team, and sad about what happened last week.
I’ll leave it to others to chew over the amount of cash that the company burned through or why the company shut down at this particular time. Instead I want to talk about the company’s vision and business model, which — if it had seen the commercial light of day — did in fact have the potential to change the online music industry for the better. Although Beyond Oblivion did get some press coverage, its unique model was never fully explained.
At a basic level, Beyond’s model was a hybrid between download services like iTunes and streaming services like Spotify. It was based on the concepts of licensed devices and play count reporting. Users could buy new Beyond-licensed devices or purchase licenses for their existing PCs or other devices. They could download tracks from the Beyond catalog to their licensed devices (a la iTunes) and listen to them as often as they wanted. The Beyond client software would securely count plays and report them for royalty purposes (a la Spotify).
Users could also add their own music files to their Beyond libraries using a process that is now called “scan and match”; Beyond would report plays of those files too, even if the original files were obtained illegally. We had also designed a way for users to add music to Beyond’s music catalog (we called it “catalog crowdsourcing”), with permission of rights holders, which could have resulted in the world’s largest legal online music catalog.
There would be no limit to the number of tracks a user could download to a licensed device. Furthermore, Beyond users could freely share their files with other Beyond users; a Beyond file could play on any Beyond-licensed device (within a given country).
Beyond Oblivion had two signed major-label deals with others in the works, and over seven million tracks in its catalog at last count.
Now here’s the real differentiator: users would pay neither monthly subscription fees nor per-download charges for the service. Beyond’s business model was to charge device makers or network operators the license fees, with the expectation that they would subsidize these fees or perhaps bundle part of them into users’ monthly network charges. If users wanted to add Beyond to their own devices, they would pay a one-time charge, expected to be well under US $100, for unlimited downloads for as long as they owned the device.
Whenever anyone knowledgeable about digital music asked for a quick explanation of Beyond’s model, I would answer, “It’s like Comes With Music on steroids.” (Comes With Music was Nokia’s attempt to create a subsidized music model for a few of its own devices.)
The problem with device maker subsidized models is that they are limited to new devices from that maker. Instead, Beyond’s intent was to build a large, global ecosystem of subsidized music that would work on a wide range of devices and networks. It would be an intermediary between device makers and network operators (license fee payers) on the one hand and music copyright owners (royalty recipients) on the other. Beyond’s pitch to the former was simple: here is a chance to eat into Apple’s market share for digital music by offering a service to users that “feels like free” but is completely legal.
The Beyond concept was based on a fundamental insight by founder Adam Kidron, a serial entrepreneur, former pop record producer, inveterate frequent flier, and spreadsheet Jedi Master. In fact, his business model began on a spreadsheet. He figured out that if he could count every play of a digital music file and pay a small royalty to the copyright owners for each one, he could make a profitable business by charging device licensing fees — essentially trading off device license fees against those “micro-royalties” — and still offer legal music for much less money than anyone else. His model took into account factors such as the expected ownership lifespans of certain device types such as PCs and mobile handsets.
Kidron determined that technology companies were the only remaining entities in the digital music value chain where revenue could come from: users are being led toward expecting to get music for free, and ad revenue has been disappointing. Thus, we tried to define a model and features with enough appeal to tech companies to get them to pay the licensing fees.
But Beyond would only have had industry-wide impact if it could sign up a critical mass of network operators and device makers at launch — a process that would require a lot of salesmanship, faith-building, and delicate discussions about exclusivity versus the power of the ecosystem. When Kidron first approached me three years ago about helping the company and explained the model, my initial thought was, “This might actually work if someone threw enough money at it.” Then he proceeded to explain the funding plan. I was impressed; he had thought it through. He didn’t just want to launch yet another music service, he wanted to move the music industry “beyond oblivion.”
The company did raise large sums of money in order to seed the entire ecosystem. It was in advanced talks with companies worldwide. A few name-brand device makers were considering putting out new Beyond-enabled models of handsets, tablets, and other devices. Wireless carriers in several geographies were considering launching services for Beyond-enabled devices. Major record labels signed licensing deals. But even with cash in hand, the negotiations among the various constituencies proved to be a long, hard slog.
Yet Beyond’s impact on the music industry was potentially much wider than mere profitability for one business. To understand this, it’s useful to look at its economic model in light of various recent governmental attempts to get network service providers to assume more responsibility for curbing copyright infringement. These have boiled down to operators paying for three different things: technology to monitor activity for possible infringement; per-user levies for use of content, and ”piracy fees” to cover copyright enforcement costs.
All of these models have serious drawbacks. Levies are inaccurate in paying copyright owners according to actual use of their content and unfair in that they charge all users the same amount regardless of their use. If network operators paid for their own piracy monitoring, they would do it in the same way that device makers have implemented DRM: at the lowest possible cost, with little regard for efficacy, and in ways that benefit them instead of copyright owners, such as customer lock-in. And “piracy fees” are the most inequitable idea of all.
A market-based solution that enables network operators to offer functionally rich access to legal content in a way that feels like free seems like a much better approach — a carrot rather than a stick. It can entice people away from copyright infringement while compensating rights holders fairly and accurately. Given the choice, a network operator ought to want to compete on offering the most attractive music service rather than be forced to pay a “copyright tax” as a cost of doing business. (By the way, this is not my retrospective view; it was all part of the original thinking.)
When Beyond was starting development, users had strong preferences for file ownership over streaming. We started with a download model and figured out a way to reconcile file ownership with usage reporting. We also designed a mechanism for determining (with reasonable accuracy) when a device changed owners, so that it would not be possible to sell a Beyond-licensed device on eBay (for example) and have the second owner inherit the music rights along with the device; “lifetime of device ownership” was key to making the numbers work.
Since then, streaming has become more popular. Yet on-demand streaming services like Spotify and Rhapsody have business models that were originally based on monthly subscription fees; they face the choice of living with a “freemium” model in which only a fraction of users pay subscription fees (Spotify, Rdio, MOG, Deezer) or persisting with an all-pay model against the rising tide of freemium (Rhapsody, Slacker Premium, Sony Music Unlimited). Either choice may be hard for those services to sustain financially over time.
In contrast, Beyond was designed to be a scalably profitable subsidized pay-per-use model from the beginning. As such, it could have had better long-term prospects than those other services.
However, three years is a very long time to be developing any kind of online business in today’s world of iterative development-and-release a la Google. Many of Beyond’s innovative features started making their way into the market through other services during the past three years. For example:
- Catch Media launched a service in the UK in 2010 that counts and monetizes users’ plays of MP3 files regardless of their origins, although the service costs users £30 per year.
- Spotify, Deezer, and Rhapsody have gotten a few bundling deals with wireless carriers, though none of these are full subsidies.
- Spotify also recently introduced an API for app developers, another feature that Beyond included from the beginning.
- The small US mobile carrier Cricket Wireless launched MuveMusic a year ago; it is an unlimited-download package bundled with Cricket’s wireless service. It has attracted over a quarter million users, although the service is limited to five handset models (mostly Android-based).
- Several services have introduced scan and match features that download files from servers to users’ devices. Apple and Catch Media offer this, while others offer it through streaming instead of downloading.
Yet only Beyond put all these features — and more — into a single offering. Apart from the business model and concepts, I can attest that its user experience was terrific. Its interface, responsiveness and sound quality on mobile devices all beat Spotify. It’s a real shame that this highly promising service did not get a chance to make the impact on the music industry that it could have.

