IFPI Claims Success of Progressive Reponse in Curbing Infringement January 30, 2012
Posted by Bill Rosenblatt in Europe, Law, New Zealand.2 comments
The International Federation for the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), the global umbrella of national music trade associations like the RIAA in the United States, published its annual Digital Music Report last week. Among the most interesting findings is results of studies of the effects of the progressive response law enacted in France in 2009.
The French Creation and Internet Law, which is referred to as “Hadopi” after the agency it created (Haute Autorité pour la Diffusion des Oeuvres et la Protection des droits sur l’Internet), is one of a handful of so-called progressive response regimes, in which ISPs in a given country are obliged to respond to complaints about file-sharing by issuing a series of increasingly stern warnings and then potentially suspending their Internet accounts or fining them.
IFPI worked with Nielsen to measure Hadopi’s effects on file-sharing in France, and found that the effect was to decrease file-sharing by 26% over the year after Hadopi’s October 2010 implementation, although the numbers have been creeping back up a bit since October 2011. IFPI’s report also published the results of a separate academic study by economists at Carnegie-Mellon University and Wellesley College that claims a net increase of 22.5-25% in paid iTunes music downloads from before to after Hadopi was implemented.
The IFPI report also cites studies that show that warning messages have an effect: a May 2011 study found that 50% of people who either received a Hadopi notice or knew someone who got one stopped their illegal file-sharing. The same measurement for South Korea, another country with progressive response in place, was 70%.
Critics of progressive response reply that P2P file-sharing has been decreasing anyway, that file-sharing is “yesterday’s problem” as copyright infringement moves from file-sharing networks to torrent sites, cyberlockers, and other places. It’s hard to argue that the reduction of 26% in French file-sharing means “piracy has decreased by 26%” (and in fact IFPI isn’t arguing that at all). Yet the graph in the IFPI report clearly indicates a drop in file-sharing activity that coincides with the deployment of Hadopi.
It’s worth bearing in mind that the vast majority of Hadopi activity is warnings, which fall under the heading of “education” instead of “technical protection measures,” because the warnings don’t actually prevent users from doing anything that they could do before.
At the same time, there is one sour note in the IFPI report: in a discussion of the graduated response system in New Zealand (which accompanied a decrease in P2P usage of 16%), rights holders complain that “the high cost of notifications to ISPs … could prevent the graduated response system being used over the long term to optimum effect.” In other words, it’s not enough to have a government-mandated requirement for ISPs to act on complaints of file-sharing; copyright owners also don’t want to have to pay to generate the complaints. I don’t know what they call this in New Zealand, but in France, Marie Antoinette might have called it “Qu’ils ont de la brioche et la manger aussi.”*
P.S. The IFPI Digital Music Report also contains the very exciting statistic that the total of paying users of music subscription services has shot up 65% over the past year to an estimated 13 million plus. That number blows by the 10 million that I thought would be reached by next September.
*”Let them have their cake and eat it too.”
Creative Commons for Music: What’s the Point? January 22, 2012
Posted by Bill Rosenblatt in Law, Music, Rights Licensing, Services, Standards.20 comments
I recently came across a music startup called Airborne Music, which touts two features: a business model based on “subscribing to an artist” for US $1/month, and music distributed under Creative Commons licenses. Like other music services that use Creative Commons, Airborne Music appeals primarily to indie artists who are looking to get exposure for their work. This got me thinking about how — or whether — Creative Commons has any real economic value for creative artists.
I have been fascinated by a dichotomy of indie vs. major-label music: indie musicians value promotion over immediate revenue, while for major-label artists it’s the other way around. (Same for book authors with respect to the Big 6 trade publishers, photographers with respect to Getty and Corbis, etc.) Back when the major labels were only allowing digital downloads with DRM — a technology intended to preserve revenue at the expense of promotion — I wondered if those few indie artists who landed major-label deals were getting the optimal promotion-versus-revenue tradeoffs, or if this issue even figured into major-label thinking about licensing terms and rights technologies.
When I looked at Airborne Music, it dawned on me that Creative Commons is interesting for indie artists who want to promote their works while preserving the right (if not the ability) to make money from them later. The Creative Commons website lists ten existing sites that enable musicians to distribute their music under CC, including big ones like the bulge-bracket-funded startup SoundCloud and the commercially-oriented BandCamp.
This is an eminently practical application of Creative Commons’s motto: “Some rights reserved.” Many CC-licensing services use the BY-SA (Attribution-Share-Alike) Creative Commons license, which gives you the right to copy and distribute the artist’s music as long as you attribute it to the artist and redistribute (i.e. share) it under the same terms. That’s exactly what indie artists want: to get their content distributed as widely as possible but to make sure that everyone knows it’s their work. Some use BY-SA-NC (Attribution-Share-Alike-Noncommercial), which adds the condition that you can’t sell the content, meaning that the artist is preserving her ability to make money from it.
It sounds great in theory. It’s just too bad that there isn’t a way to make sure that those rights are actually respected. There is a rights expression language for Creative Commons (CC REL), which makes it possible for content rendering or editing software to read the license (in XML RDFa) and act accordingly. As a technology, the REL concept originated with Mark Stefik at Xerox PARC in the mid-1990s; the eminent MIT computer scientist Hal Abelson created CC REL in 2008. Since then, the Creative Commons organization has maintained something of an arms-length relationship with CC REL: it describes the language and offers links to information about it, but it doesn’t (for example) include CC REL code in the actual licenses it offers.
More to the point, while there are code libraries for generating CC REL code, I have yet to hear of a working system that actually reads CC REL license terms and acts on them. (Yes, this would be extraordinarily difficult to achieve with any completeness, e.g., taking Fair Use into account.)
Without a real enforcement mechanism, CC licenses are all little more than labels, like the garment care hieroglyphics mandated by the Federal Trade Commission in the United States. For example, some BY-SA-licensed music tracks may end up in mashups. How many of those mashups will attribute the sources’ artists properly? Not many, I would guess. Conversely, what really prevents someone who gets music licensed under ND (No Derivative Works) terms from remixing or excerpting in ways that aren’t considered Fair Use? Are these people really afraid of being sued? I hardly think so.
This trap door into the legal system, as I have called it, makes Creative Commons licensing of more theoretical than practical interest. The practical value of CC seems to be concentrated in business-to-business content licensing agreements, where corporations need to take more responsibility for observing licensing terms and CC’s ready-made licenses make it easy for them to do so. The music site Jamendo is a good example of this: it licenses its members’ music content for commercial sync rights to movie and TV producers while making it free to the public.
Free culture advocates like to tell content creators that they should give up control over their content in the digital age. As far as I’m concerned, anyone who claims to welcome the end of control and also supports Creative Commons is talking through both sides of his mouth. If you use a Creative Commons license, you express a desire for control, even if you don’t actually get very much of it. What you really get is a badge that describes your intentions — a badge that a large and increasing number of web-savvy people recognize. Yet as a practical matter, a Creative Commons logo on your site is tantamount to a statement to the average user that the content is free for the taking.
The truth is that sometimes artists benefit most from lack of control over their content, while other times they benefit from more control. The copyright system is supposed to make sure that the public’s and creators’ benefits from creative works are balanced in order to optimize creative output. Creative Commons purports to provide simple means of redressing what its designers believe is a lack of balance in the current copyright law. But to be attractive to artists, CC needs to offer them ways to determine their levels of control in ways that the copyright system does not support.
In the end, Creative Commons is a burglar alarm sign on your lawn without the actual alarm system. You can easily buy fake alarm signs for a few dollars, whereas real alarm systems cost thousands. It’s the same with digital content. At least Creative Commons, like almost all of the content licensed with it, is free.
(I should add that I wear the badge myself. My whitepapers and this blog are licensed under Creative Commons BY-NC-ND (Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works) terms. I would at least rather have the copyright-savvy people who read this know my intentions.)
Updated DRM Reference Table Now Available January 19, 2012
Posted by Bill Rosenblatt in Uncategorized.add a comment
I have updated the GiantSteps DRM and Content Protection Reference Table that I have been maintaining for the past three years. This version updates the previous version from April 2010. The update includes updated information on over three dozen DRM, conditional access, and other content protection technologies, as well as an expanded section on independent protection technologies for PC games and software.
You can get a copy of the table in PDF (4 x 2 page layout) for free here (scroll down to the form and choose “DRM and Content Protection Reference Table (PDF)” from the dropdown menu). Or, if you would like the unprotected Excel spreadsheet, the cost is USD 300 (PayPal accepted), click here to order.
UltraViolet Gets Two Lifelines January 12, 2012
Posted by Bill Rosenblatt in Economics, Fingerprinting, Services, Standards, Video.add a comment
A panel at this week’s CES show in Las Vegas yielded two pieces of positive news for the DECE/UltraViolet standard, after a launch several months ago with Warner Bros. and its Flixster subsidiary that could charitably be called “premature.” Of the two news items, one is a nice to have, but the other is a game-changer.
Let’s get to the game-changer first: Amazon announced that a major Hollywood studio is licensing its content for UltraViolet distribution through the online retail giant. The Amazon executive didn’t name the studio, though many assume it’s Warner Bros. Even if it’s a single studio, the importance of this announcement to the likelihood of UltraViolet’s success in the market cannot be overstated.
Leaving aside UltraViolet’s initial technical glitches and shortage of available titles, the problem with UltraViolet from a market perspective had always been a lukewarm interest from online retailers. As I’ll explain, this hasn’t been a surprise, but Amazon’s new interest in UltraViolet could make all the difference.
UltraViolet is the “brand name” of a standard from a group called the Digital Entertainment Content Ecosystem (DECE), headed by Sony Pictures executive Mitch Singer. It implements a so-called rights locker for digital movies and other video content. Users can establish UltraViolet accounts for themselves and family members. Then they can obtain movies in one format (say, Blu-ray) and be entitled to get it in other formats for other devices (say, Windows Media file download for PCs). They can also stream the content to a web browser anywhere. The rights locker, managed by Neustar Inc., tracks each user’s purchases.
In other words, UltraViolet promises users format independence and a hedge against format obsolescence, while providing some protection for the content by requiring it to be packaged in several approved DRM and stream encryption schemes. It includes a few limitations on the number of devices and family members that can be associated with a single UltraViolet account, but in general UltraViolet is designed to make video content more portable and interoperable than, say, DVDs or iTunes downloads.
Five of the six major Hollywood studios (all but Disney*), plus the “major indie” Lionsgate, are participating in UltraViolet.
One of the design goals of UltraViolet was to ensure that no single retailer could attain a market share large enough to be able to control downstream economics — in other words, to avoid a replay of Apple’s dominance of digital music downloads (and possibly Amazon’s dominance of e-books). To do this, the DECE studios pushed for ways to thwart consumer lock-in by online retailers that would sell UltraViolet content.
The most important example of this is rights locker portability: users can access their rights lockers from any participating retailer. UltraViolet retailers must compete with each other through value-added features.
Amazon’s Kindle e-book scheme offers a good illustration of platform lock-in and how it differs from other features that a retailer can build or offer. If you buy an e-book on Amazon, you can download and read it on a wide variety of devices: not just Kindle e-readers but also iPads, iPhones, Android devices, BlackBerrys, PCs, and Macs — in other words, pretty much everything but other e-reader devices. You get e-book portability — it will even remember where you last left off if you resume reading an e-book on another device — but you are still tied to Amazon as a retailer. If you want to read the same e-book on a Nook, for example, you have to buy it separately from Barnes & Noble (and then you can read that e-book on your PC, Mac, iPhone, Android, etc.).
This lock-in gives Amazon power in the market as a retailer; it had 58% market share as of February 2011 (by comparison, Apple has over 70% of the music download market). UltraViolet wants to make it as difficult as possible for a single digital video retailer to assert such market power.
The downside of that policy has been a lack of enthusiasm among retailers to sell UltraViolet-licensed content — which entails significant development investment and operational expenses. A good shorthand way to evaluate the potential impact of a standards initiative is to look at the list of participants: what points in the value chain are represented, how many of the top companies in each category, and so on. In DECE’s case, members have included most of the major movie studios, plenty of consumer device makers, lots of DRM and conditional access technology vendors, and so on, but few big-name retailers… one of which (Best Buy) already had a different system for delivering digital video content via Sonic Solutions.
Warner Bros. tried to jump-start the UltraViolet ecosystem by acquiring Flixster, a movie-oriented social networking startup, adding digital video e-commerce capability, and using it as an UltraViolet retailer for a handful of Warner titles. This has been little more than a proof-of-concept test, which was plagued by some technical glitches and suboptimal user experience — all of which, according to Singer, have been fixed.
It would be unworkable for Hollywood to pin its hopes for its next big digital format on a small unknown retailer owned by one of the studios. It has been vitally necessary to attract a big-name retailer to both validate the concept and provide the necessary marketing and infrastructure footprints. There had been talk of Wal-Mart entering the UltraViolet ecosystem, although it already has its own video delivery scheme through VUDU. But otherwise, the membership list had been short on major retailers.
Of course, Amazon is the major-est online retailer of them all. And it so happens that Amazon’s digital video strategy is a good fit to UltraViolet in two ways. First, Amazon currently runs a streaming service (Amazon Instant Video), whereas UltraViolet is primarily focused on downloads, a/k/a Electronic Sell Through (EST): the idea of UltraViolet is to buy a download and only then be able to view it via streaming.
Second, Amazon Instant Video does not look particularly successful. Of course, Amazon does not reveal user numbers, but it is telling that Amazon included Instant Video Unlimited as a perk in its US $79/year Amazon Prime program… and that when people extol the virtues of Amazon Prime, they tend to emphasize the free overnight shipping but rarely the streaming video.
The biggest winner thus far in the paid online video sweepstakes is Netflix, with about 24 million subscribers as of mid-2011. Netflix’s subscription-on-demand model is most likely far more popular than Amazon Instant Video’s pay-per-view (except for Amazon Prime members) model. Thus Amazon may be looking for ways to improve its market position in video without having to hack away at the Netflix streaming juggernaut.
The video download market is in comparative infancy. It has no runaway market leader a la Netflix, or Apple in music. If this situation persists long enough, and if Amazon’s trial run with UltraViolet is successful, then other retailers might see UltraViolet as a viable format as well… precisely because it will make them better able to compete with the Online Retailing Gorilla.
Yet the other dimension of UltraViolet that is currently lacking is availability of titles. And that’s where the other CES announcement comes in. Samsung announced a “Disc to Digital” feature that it will incorporate into new Blu-ray players later this year. With this feature, users can slide in their Blu-ray discs or DVDs, and if the content is “eligible,” they can choose to have that content available in their UltraViolet rights lockers for delivery in any UltraViolet-compliant format.
The Disc to Digital feature is a collaboration between Flixster (i.e. Warner Bros.) as online retailer and Rovi as technology supplier. It works in a manner that is analogous to “scan and match” services for music such as Apple iTunes Match: it scans your DVD or Blu-ray disc, identifies the movie, and if the movie is available in the UltraViolet library of licensed content, gives you an UltraViolet rights locker entry for that movie. Rovi’s content identification technology and metadata library are undoubtedly at the heart of this scheme.
There are two catches: first, users will have to pay a “nominal” fee per disc for this service, which is even larger (and as yet unspecified) if they want it in high definition; second, it is limited to “eligible” content, and no one has offered a definition of “eligible” yet (beyond the fact that the content must come from one of the DECE participating studios). But surely the “eligible” catalog will exceed the current list (19 titles) by orders of magnitude, or the service will not be worth launching.
Nevertheless, these developments are very positive news for DECE/UltraViolet after months of embarrassments and bad press. DECE still has lots of work to do to make UltraViolet successful enough to be the major studios’ designated successor to Blu-ray, but at last it’s on track.
*Yes, I’m aware of the irony of using a tag line from “Who Wants to Be a Millionare” in the title of this article: Disney owns the home entertainment distribution rights to that hit TV game show.
New White Paper: Content Security Requirements for Multi-Screen Video Services January 9, 2012
Posted by Bill Rosenblatt in Conditional Access, DRM, Technologies, Video, Watermarking, White Papers.add a comment
I have released a new white paper on content security requirements for video services that distribute content to multiple devices. This white paper discusses copyright owners’ requirements for security in today’s world of proliferating devices and delivery channels.
So-called managed networks (cable, satellite, and telco TV) are under increasing pressure to compete with “over the top” (OTT) video services that can run on any IP-based (unmanaged) network to a variety of devices — services like Netflix and Hulu. In the US, in fact, total subscriberships of OTT services are fast approaching the total subscriberships of cable, satellite, and telco TV.
Therefore pay-TV operators have to respond by making their content available on a similar variety of devices and even through unmanaged networks. While some major pay-TV providers like Comcast and Time Warner Cable are launching “TV Everywhere” services, many more pay-TV operators are trying to keep up by building their own service extensions onto mobile phones, tablets, and home devices other than traditional set-top boxes (STBs).
Content security is one of the many requirements that operators have to meet in order to license content from studios, TV networks, sports leagues, and other major content sources. Life for pay-TV operators used to be relatively simple: adopt a conditional access (CA) technology that was equally effective in thwarting signal theft as it was in thwarting content piracy. Economic and security goals were aligned between operators and copyright owners. Now life is considerably more complicated, as operators have to support home networks and branch out into mobile services. Content security requirements are more complicated as well.
This white paper gathers security requirements from major content owners and describes them in a single document. The intent is to help pay-TV operators and other video service providers that are looking to launch multi-screen video services, so that they know what to expect and avoid any unpleasant surprises with regard to security requirements when licensing content to offer through their services.
I spoke to representatives from most of the major Hollywood studios to get their requirements. Although it is not possible to build a gigantic table that an operator can use to look up DRM or conditional access requirements for any given delivery modality and client device — among other things, such a table would become obsolete very quickly — I was able to create a set of guidelines that should be useful for operators.
Content security guidelines do depend on certain factors, including release windows (how long after a film’s theatrical release or a TV show’s first airing), display quality, and the usage rules granted to users and their devices. In the white paper, I map these factors to certain specific content security requirements, such as roots of trust, watermarks, software hardening, and DRM robustness rules. Security guidelines also depend on external market factors that the white paper also describes.
Many thanks to Verimatrix for commissioning this white paper. To obtain it, follow this link and fill out the form for a PDF download. Feel free to contact me with any questions or other follow-up.
Oblivion, But Not Beyond January 2, 2012
Posted by Bill Rosenblatt in Music, Services.16 comments
Last week, the music startup Beyond Oblivion ceased operations. The shutdown happened after three years of development and shortly before the company’s service was to go into public beta. The news was leaked to Engadget last Thursday and became “official” when it was reported in the Financial Times on Saturday.
First, the disclosure: I consulted to Beyond Oblivion throughout much of the company’s existence. I’m proud of what we did, privileged to have worked with its top-notch management team, and sad about what happened last week.
I’ll leave it to others to chew over the amount of cash that the company burned through or why the company shut down at this particular time. Instead I want to talk about the company’s vision and business model, which — if it had seen the commercial light of day — did in fact have the potential to change the online music industry for the better. Although Beyond Oblivion did get some press coverage, its unique model was never fully explained.
At a basic level, Beyond’s model was a hybrid between download services like iTunes and streaming services like Spotify. It was based on the concepts of licensed devices and play count reporting. Users could buy new Beyond-licensed devices or purchase licenses for their existing PCs or other devices. They could download tracks from the Beyond catalog to their licensed devices (a la iTunes) and listen to them as often as they wanted. The Beyond client software would securely count plays and report them for royalty purposes (a la Spotify).
Users could also add their own music files to their Beyond libraries using a process that is now called “scan and match”; Beyond would report plays of those files too, even if the original files were obtained illegally. We had also designed a way for users to add music to Beyond’s music catalog (we called it “catalog crowdsourcing”), with permission of rights holders, which could have resulted in the world’s largest legal online music catalog.
There would be no limit to the number of tracks a user could download to a licensed device. Furthermore, Beyond users could freely share their files with other Beyond users; a Beyond file could play on any Beyond-licensed device (within a given country).
Beyond Oblivion had two signed major-label deals with others in the works, and over seven million tracks in its catalog at last count.
Now here’s the real differentiator: users would pay neither monthly subscription fees nor per-download charges for the service. Beyond’s business model was to charge device makers or network operators the license fees, with the expectation that they would subsidize these fees or perhaps bundle part of them into users’ monthly network charges. If users wanted to add Beyond to their own devices, they would pay a one-time charge, expected to be well under US $100, for unlimited downloads for as long as they owned the device.
Whenever anyone knowledgeable about digital music asked for a quick explanation of Beyond’s model, I would answer, “It’s like Comes With Music on steroids.” (Comes With Music was Nokia’s attempt to create a subsidized music model for a few of its own devices.)
The problem with device maker subsidized models is that they are limited to new devices from that maker. Instead, Beyond’s intent was to build a large, global ecosystem of subsidized music that would work on a wide range of devices and networks. It would be an intermediary between device makers and network operators (license fee payers) on the one hand and music copyright owners (royalty recipients) on the other. Beyond’s pitch to the former was simple: here is a chance to eat into Apple’s market share for digital music by offering a service to users that “feels like free” but is completely legal.
The Beyond concept was based on a fundamental insight by founder Adam Kidron, a serial entrepreneur, former pop record producer, inveterate frequent flier, and spreadsheet Jedi Master. In fact, his business model began on a spreadsheet. He figured out that if he could count every play of a digital music file and pay a small royalty to the copyright owners for each one, he could make a profitable business by charging device licensing fees — essentially trading off device license fees against those “micro-royalties” — and still offer legal music for much less money than anyone else. His model took into account factors such as the expected ownership lifespans of certain device types such as PCs and mobile handsets.
Kidron determined that technology companies were the only remaining entities in the digital music value chain where revenue could come from: users are being led toward expecting to get music for free, and ad revenue has been disappointing. Thus, we tried to define a model and features with enough appeal to tech companies to get them to pay the licensing fees.
But Beyond would only have had industry-wide impact if it could sign up a critical mass of network operators and device makers at launch — a process that would require a lot of salesmanship, faith-building, and delicate discussions about exclusivity versus the power of the ecosystem. When Kidron first approached me three years ago about helping the company and explained the model, my initial thought was, “This might actually work if someone threw enough money at it.” Then he proceeded to explain the funding plan. I was impressed; he had thought it through. He didn’t just want to launch yet another music service, he wanted to move the music industry “beyond oblivion.”
The company did raise large sums of money in order to seed the entire ecosystem. It was in advanced talks with companies worldwide. A few name-brand device makers were considering putting out new Beyond-enabled models of handsets, tablets, and other devices. Wireless carriers in several geographies were considering launching services for Beyond-enabled devices. Major record labels signed licensing deals. But even with cash in hand, the negotiations among the various constituencies proved to be a long, hard slog.
Yet Beyond’s impact on the music industry was potentially much wider than mere profitability for one business. To understand this, it’s useful to look at its economic model in light of various recent governmental attempts to get network service providers to assume more responsibility for curbing copyright infringement. These have boiled down to operators paying for three different things: technology to monitor activity for possible infringement; per-user levies for use of content, and ”piracy fees” to cover copyright enforcement costs.
All of these models have serious drawbacks. Levies are inaccurate in paying copyright owners according to actual use of their content and unfair in that they charge all users the same amount regardless of their use. If network operators paid for their own piracy monitoring, they would do it in the same way that device makers have implemented DRM: at the lowest possible cost, with little regard for efficacy, and in ways that benefit them instead of copyright owners, such as customer lock-in. And “piracy fees” are the most inequitable idea of all.
A market-based solution that enables network operators to offer functionally rich access to legal content in a way that feels like free seems like a much better approach — a carrot rather than a stick. It can entice people away from copyright infringement while compensating rights holders fairly and accurately. Given the choice, a network operator ought to want to compete on offering the most attractive music service rather than be forced to pay a “copyright tax” as a cost of doing business. (By the way, this is not my retrospective view; it was all part of the original thinking.)
When Beyond was starting development, users had strong preferences for file ownership over streaming. We started with a download model and figured out a way to reconcile file ownership with usage reporting. We also designed a mechanism for determining (with reasonable accuracy) when a device changed owners, so that it would not be possible to sell a Beyond-licensed device on eBay (for example) and have the second owner inherit the music rights along with the device; “lifetime of device ownership” was key to making the numbers work.
Since then, streaming has become more popular. Yet on-demand streaming services like Spotify and Rhapsody have business models that were originally based on monthly subscription fees; they face the choice of living with a “freemium” model in which only a fraction of users pay subscription fees (Spotify, Rdio, MOG, Deezer) or persisting with an all-pay model against the rising tide of freemium (Rhapsody, Slacker Premium, Sony Music Unlimited). Either choice may be hard for those services to sustain financially over time.
In contrast, Beyond was designed to be a scalably profitable subsidized pay-per-use model from the beginning. As such, it could have had better long-term prospects than those other services.
However, three years is a very long time to be developing any kind of online business in today’s world of iterative development-and-release a la Google. Many of Beyond’s innovative features started making their way into the market through other services during the past three years. For example:
- Catch Media launched a service in the UK in 2010 that counts and monetizes users’ plays of MP3 files regardless of their origins, although the service costs users £30 per year.
- Spotify, Deezer, and Rhapsody have gotten a few bundling deals with wireless carriers, though none of these are full subsidies.
- Spotify also recently introduced an API for app developers, another feature that Beyond included from the beginning.
- The small US mobile carrier Cricket Wireless launched MuveMusic a year ago; it is an unlimited-download package bundled with Cricket’s wireless service. It has attracted over a quarter million users, although the service is limited to five handset models (mostly Android-based).
- Several services have introduced scan and match features that download files from servers to users’ devices. Apple and Catch Media offer this, while others offer it through streaming instead of downloading.
Yet only Beyond put all these features — and more — into a single offering. Apart from the business model and concepts, I can attest that its user experience was terrific. Its interface, responsiveness and sound quality on mobile devices all beat Spotify. It’s a real shame that this highly promising service did not get a chance to make the impact on the music industry that it could have.
Robert Levine Tells the Rest of the Story December 21, 2011
Posted by Bill Rosenblatt in Book reviews.4 comments
Robert Levine’s excellent debut book, Free Ride: How Digital Parasites Are Destroying the Culture Business, and How the Culture Business Can Fight Back, was released back in October, but with the current firestorm over the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) in Congress, its proper moment is now.
The public side of the SOPA opera is playing out according to a Script that — as Levine documents in this book — has been standard repertoire for years. The Script has a cast of characters, including Good Guys who fight for freedom and justice and consumer rights, and Bad Guys bent on destroying those things. The Bad Guys are the MPAA and RIAA, and sometimes telcos and cable companies; the Good Guys are Google, a few other tech companies, some brave startups, a handful of scrappy Davids (as in vs. Goliath) in Washington, and a coterie of law professors who, being tenured, have little personal use for copyright.
Apart from some ambivalence over Apple, The Script has varied little over the years. It is picked up and performed on a regular basis by tech pundits whose objective in life is to improve their Google search rankings. No one dares deviate from The Script for fear of being ostracized by important content aggregators and purveyors of conventional wisdom, both of which generate more pageviews for them.
The Script has gotten really tiresome. It’s not necessarily wrong; it’s just old, and it’s shallow. It’s gone well past its sell-by date — or metaphorically and olfactorily speaking, its free-to-air window. And thanks to this book, the world can now know that there are other sides to the story, and that it’s OK to talk about them.
If Jaron Lanier’s You Are Not a Gadget from last year is the philosophical tract on which a new movement in favor of content creators’ rights has been founded, then Free Ride provides the factual foundation on which such a movement should be based. And just as Lanier gets cred from being a veteran technologist and inventor of Virtual Reality, Levine is a former editor at Wired (as well as Billboard).
This book looks beneath the so-called copyright wars that play out in public, lets facts about how the media and technology businesses operate speak for themselves (for the most part), and airs out arguments that you don’t see in Wired or on TechCrunch. It is a is a well-constructed piece of business journalism, not a tedious screed in the vein of Mark Helprin’s Digital Barbarism or Clifford Stoll’s Silicon Snake Oil.
Free Ride is about how the technology business is just that — a business – and as such, it behaves the way businesses are supposed to behave if they are to do things like increase their stock prices. Levine adroitly follows the trail of money that powers legislation and advocacy, which in turn affect public opinion as well as laws. As he puts it, “Copyright holders talk about theft while technology companies hide behind the public interest”, yet ”[i]t isn’t out of idealism that Google spends millions of dollars to influence public policy.”
Levine shows that Google is the largest of several technology companies that influence policy by funding organizations like the New America Foundation, Public Knowledge, Creative Commons, and Berkman Centers for Internet and Society at Harvard and Stanford.
Lobbying organizations’ modus operandi is to rally people and organizations around messages that elicit contributions. Messages like “keep the Internet free and open” and “fight censorship” resonate with the public, especially when they align with getting content for free. When a company like Google funds these organizations, the effect is to put a positive PR spin behind activities that benefit those companies — a spin that the likes of the RIAA and MPAA don’t enjoy (to put it mildly). The effect is also to favor issues that benefit tech companies, such as loosening copyright, over other ostensibly pro-consumer areas such as safeguarding online privacy, which don’t benefit tech companies.
Levine also does an excellent job of chronicling the history of the content industry’s attempts to get laws and regulations passed that help clamp down on copyright infringement and the tech industry’s long-held position that any such rules are unacceptable. He says: “…free culture advocates take any chance they get to argue that the media business can adjust to a world in which laws against illegal copying are not enforced. Even if listeners aren’t convinced, the flurry of studies, op-eds, and panel events create an atmosphere of uncertainty that makes it hard to pass laws that would be more effective in tackling piracy.” And: “Although the groups backed by Google have some smart ideas for reforming copyright, they also want to make the current laws impossible to enforce.”
He also provides several chapters’ worth of facts that demonstrate that consumers get the content they pay for. For television, for example, he explores “the business model[s] that brought us Mister Ed” (network TV, paid by advertising), Mad Men (cable TV, paid by consumers), The Bachelor (reality TV, so cheap to produce), and “Charlie Bit My Finger” (YouTube, essentially cost-free), and he suggests that we’re on a slippery slope towards a world where all we get is the latter. He shows that it’s not just about making the world safe for the latest Hollywood blockbuster or teen-pop starlet; it’s about maintaining a model that enables any worthy content creator to recover costs and maybe even make a living.
The larger point of Free Ride is that content has inherent value and that mechanisms must be created or maintained to preserve that value, while the technology industry is destroying that value or diverting it from creators towards itself. Levine lets facts and quotations tumble forth to show this. One of my favorite examples of the latter is a quote from Avner Ronen, CEO of Boxee and thus a poster child for “free riding”: “If [content owners] really don’t want people to access their content for free online, they can fix it very easily—just don’t put the content online. Then they risk piracy.” Levine doesn’t comment on the utter ridiculousness of Ronen’s statement, instead letting it stand on its own.
The book’s corollary is that today’s prevailing attitude of treating content as an industry, while treating technology as an inevitable and untamable force of nature, is neither fair nor balanced. The inevitable, untamable force of nature is creativity, which can be artistic, technological, or both. If you’re going to accuse record labels and movie studios of acting like businesses, you have to accuse big tech companies of doing the same.
Yet Levine is hardly an apologist for the media industry. For example, he agrees that the term of copyright and statutory damages for infringement under U.S. law are way too long and large, and he finds the media industry just as guilty as anyone else of funding “research studies” that produce blatantly biased results. In fact, Levine’s journalistic instincts often get the better of him as he feels compelled to balance every factual assertion that bolsters his point with a counterfactual that softens it; the book ends up being far more balanced than its polemic subtitle suggests.
The final part of Free Ride discusses possible solutions to the problems of copyright. This is where the book falls short — and not just because there aren’t any easy answers. Levine looks to developments outside the United States, particularly in Europe, and sees various things that look like they are worth adopting on this side of the Pond.
While Levine has a fine grasp on copyright litigation and party politics in Europe, he doesn’t show much beyond a view of greener grass on the European lawn when it comes to licensing schemes. His European licensing ambassador appears to have been Jim Griffin, the well-known and respected advocate of blanket licensing. Griffin seems to have extolled all of the benefits of blanket licensing to Levine but left him ignorant of the many shortcomings of copyright and content licensing under such systems in Europe (and elsewhere): inequitable royalty distribution, irrational levy schemes, opaque accounting, inefficiencies, resistance to new business models, cross-border chaos, and more. (This is especially ironic given that Levine now lives in Berlin.)
Thus Levine doesn’t explore European national copyright collecting societies and their relationships to their countries’ copyright policy. He also runs across former French and German culture ministers in his travels, but he fails to notice the additional complexities created by the presence of those culture ministries in the mix. Given that the United States is the only industrialized country in the world that doesn’t have a culture ministry, this may not be surprising, but these would all have been rich veins to explore in order to understand some of the problems in European and international copyright policy, and how they might be solved.
Furthermore, if Levine wanted further hints at where solutions might come from, he might have heeded the advice of William Patry, the prodigious copyright scholar who now works at Google. In his 2009 book, Moral Panics and the Copyright Wars, Patry suggests that “the answer to the machine is in the machine.” In other words, Levine talked to a lot of lawyers, corporate spokespeople, and policy wonks; he might also have talked to more technologists about how things like DRM and filtering work, how they affect user experience and cost, and how they interface with copyright law.
But consider the last few paragraphs quibbles from someone who has been in these arguments for a long time. Free Ride is a hurricane’s worth of fresh air, a book that ought to change the conversation about online content and copyright. For example, a reporter from a respected tech website told me recently that he dare not write any pro-copyright stories for fear of not being picked up by aggregators and of being ostracized by his peers. This form of hive-mind-based self-censorship ought to be an outrage.
Yet the conversation may already be changing; which brings us around to SOPA. A recent Levine-influenced piece in New York magazine said: “There’s a reasonable debate to be had over whether SOPA and its Senate companion, the Protect IP Act, represent needed reforms or Draconian regulatory overreach. … Really, SOPA is just an old-fashioned Washington battle between two entrenched corporate camps: the entertainment companies that don’t want their output ripped off, and the web companies that don’t want to be saddled with increased compliance costs.”
New York magazine isn’t Wired, but such remarks would have been heresy as recently as last year. Descriptions of the SOPA opera as “old-fashioned” and companies like Google as “entrenched” are actual changes in the Script. It’s about time.
Public Library E-Book Lending Must Change to Survive December 4, 2011
Posted by Bill Rosenblatt in DRM, Law, Publishing, Uncategorized.9 comments
A few events over the past few weeks illustrate the downward arc that I have suggested is in store for public libraries in the e-book age. First, Amazon introduced its own e-book “lending library” for members of its $79/year Amazon Prime service, which allows users to “borrow” one e-book at a time, with no due dates. Second, yet another major trade book publisher, Penguin, got into a spat with public libraries over e-book lending. Penguin stopped offering new titles and withheld Kindle access to all titles, out of unspecified security concerns with OverDrive (the service that powers most U.S. e-book library lending) and Amazon. (Penguin subsequently restored access for existing titles, but not for new ones.)
The Penguin incident is only the latest in what will undoubtedly be a long series of squabbles between publishers and libraries over e-book lending. In fact, five of the “Big Six” U.S. trade book publishers are now either limiting their e-book licensing to libraries or not licensing at all — and the sixth (and largest), Random House, is reportedly reconsidering its library e-book licensing policies. Such spats may well lead to a world of off-putting restrictions and confusion for libraries and their patrons.
Libraries have two fundamental problems here: they have less control over the situation than publishers do, and they are about to get some serious competition from the private sector. An article in Publishers Weekly gives an overview of Amazon’s e-book lending feature and its implications for publishers and authors. In a nutshell, the program is currently limited to a few thousand titles that originate either from Amazon itself or from smaller publishers that still sell e-books to Amazon under a wholesale model, as opposed to the “agent” model used by most major trade publishers, which forbids such activity.
But the Publishers Weekly piece only covers the impact of e-book lending on publishers and authors, many of whom are raising a fuss about Amazon’s program. It says nothing about the program’s impact on public libraries. The executive director of the American Library Association (ALA), Keith Fiels, has publicly expressed a lack of concern over the impact of Amazon’s lending program, given its limited range of titles and that it’s part of a subscription program that includes other features such as streaming video and free expedited shipping. The ALA is more concerned about major-publisher moves like Penguin’s.
Indeed, public libraries are experiencing major growth in e-book lending, especially since Amazon joined the e-lending world by opening up its DRM to enable lending and integrating it with OverDrive’s library lending service. Another piece of evidence that library e-lending is expanding is the entry of a Seattle-based startup called BlueFire Productions as the first serious competitor to OverDrive in the public library space.
At bottom, this is about two things: ways to make e-books available legally for free, and the promotional value of free distribution. That’s why libraries should be worried. First, consumers generally don’t care where they get free legal e-books, as long as they are available conveniently and can be read on their favorite devices. Second, what Amazon has started as a limited service that’s only available to an elite tier of customers will surely become more widely available and with more titles, especially with competitors like Barnes & Noble constantly looking for ways to differentiate themselves from the market leader.
Amazon subsidizes the wholesale cost of e-books that it lends to Amazon Prime members. It does this to make its own services and devices more attractive, not to spur sales of those e-books. If and when B&N offers an equivalent feature, it will undoubtedly do the same.
If I were Keith Fiels at the ALA, I would be very, very afraid. The e-book publishing world may be about to split up into the equivalent of the music industry’s major and indie labels: major labels tend to make deals that maximize revenue and limit free promotion, while indies try for maximum promotion in hopes of getting revenue later. When you apply this dichotomy to publishers and e-books, you will see that libraries will inevitably get squeezed out.
The majors will make life increasingly difficult for public libraries through refusal to license or restrictive and confusing licensing terms. Meanwhile, smaller publishers will “lend” their titles through Amazon and other e-book services — and will most likely be happy with the arrangement for the promotional value it gets them. And some indie publishers will give their e-books away outright — through e-book retailers or through sites like Facebook — in hopes of getting exposure for their authors and selling hardcopy titles, just as thousands of indie musicians used to give away MP3s on MySpace. And let’s not forget that e-book prices are often much lower than their hardcopy counterparts to begin with.
Then it will only be a matter of time until some publishing industry equivalent of Michael Robertson (the music industry’s digital provocateur) will create a search engine for finding free e-books from all of these sources in a single convenient place, storing them in an online locker, sharing them with friends, etc.
If you extrapolate from these changes, you can see how public libraries could become virtually irrelevant for e-book readers.
It’s all because publishers get to decide what e-book titles libraries may lend and (to some extent) under what terms. Again, think of this in music terms: radio stations get the right to play whatever music they want under a license granted by law — a so-called statutory license. Online equivalents of radio (e.g., Pandora, iHeartRadio) get similar rights. Library lending of digital music is virtually nonexistent; radio remains the primary promotional channel for record companies. Perhaps it’s time to think more carefully about public libraries in this light for e-books, as I’ll explain.
There is no equivalent of a statutory license for e-books that would allow libraries to lend them without explicit, title-by-title permission from publishers. As I’ve discussed previously, libraries do get rights under Section 108 of the copyright law to lend e-books under certain conditions. But because most publishers only give libraries e-books to lend as DRM-protected files with license terms attached to them, and Section 108 requires libraries to abide by those license terms, libraries can’t exercise those rights. In effect, those rights have no value for libraries.
Libraries simply do not have enough leverage against major publishers and retailers to improve this situation in the private sector. If they are to remain relevant in the e-book age, they are going to need to push for significant legal reforms, which both publishers and retailers will undoubtedly resist.
I previously suggested one option, albeit in a somewhat tongue-in-cheek manner: push for the Copyright Office to define an exemption to the law that criminalizes hacking of DRMs (Section 1201 of the Copyright Act) so that public libraries can legally remove DRM for the purpose of lending e-books if they repackage them with DRM to enforce lending terms. However, this has two disadvantages: exemptions to Section 1201 only last for three years, until the Copyright Office considers a new set of exemptions, and publishers could push for stronger DRMs that are harder to hack.
The “cleanest” solution to this problem would be to enact Digital First Sale, i.e., an extension to Section 109 of the copyright law that lets anyone do whatever they want with digital downloads once they have acquired them legally. (We had a great discussion on this subject at last week’s conference.) Public libraries owe their existence to First Sale (on physical goods) in the first place. But that won’t help for e-books as long as publishers distribute them with DRM and DRM hacking is still illegal; and anyway, as I discussed recently, Digital First Sale isn’t likely to happen anytime soon. Therefore it would be worth libraries’ while to investigate changes to the law that help them lend e-books while leaving Digital First Sale off the table.
One option would be to push for additional rights for libraries under Section 108. At a minimum, Subsection (f)(4) would have to be relaxed so that publishers may lend e-books even if the licenses they come with forbid this activity. This would be tantamount to a statutory license for libraries to lend e-books without explicit permission from publishers.
As a practical matter, this wouldn’t really change the way things are done today. Libraries lend e-books through third parties like OverDrive, which already get e-books from publishers without DRM and package them with DRM — just like music and video retail services. And provisions already exist in Section 108 that hold libraries liable if they make their own unauthorized copies of e-books. OverDrive and its ilk use DRM to enforce one-copy-at-a time lending as well as the lending time limits that are in libraries’ own best interests.
This change in the law would improve the situation for libraries substantially. However, the economics may have to change to make it palatable to publishers. For example, libraries acquire e-books for their collections by paying for them title by title, just as they pay for printed books. Radio stations, on the other hand, typically get free copies of recordings from record labels but pay royalties to the music industry for playing them on the air.
If publishers acknowledge the promotional value of library e-book lending, then they might be willing to accept a statutory license to lend e-books if they can negotiate a per-loan royalty rate in lieu of upfront purchase prices. The Copyright Clearance Center, for example, would be in a good position to manage these payments and royalty disbursements, just as ASCAP, BMI, and SoundExchange do for music.
This type of arrangement would enable libraries to maintain huge collections of e-books (through service providers like OverDrive and BlueFire, which would actually house and distribute the e-books) and thus serve the public well. At the same time, the negotiations would have to resolve questions of how many copies of an e-book a given library could lend out concurrently; one copy per library doesn’t reflect the fact that big libraries acquire multiple copies of popular titles. Is it possible for the numbers to defined so as to be fair to both publishers and libraries? That would be a good question for the Section 108 Study Group, the venue for recommending changes to that section of the copyright law, which used to convene every five years but was disbanded by Congress after its last report in 2008.
A limited form of just such a statutory license-type solution has actually been suggested in the private sector already, in the proposed settlement to publishers’ and authors’ lawsuits against Google. It includes giving public libraries rights to make every book scanned on Google’s behalf — over 12 million titles at last count — available on a single terminal within each library. Libraries would not even have to pay for this. However, this doesn’t allow e-books to be available outside of libraries’ physical confines, it doesn’t allow libraries to acquire multiple copies of e-books they want to make available to more than one patron at a time, and Google can withhold up to 15% of its scanned titles at its discretion.
The Google book settlement is still unresolved, but the terms in it show that publishers may be willing to grant libraries some limited e-book lending rights. Libraries have complained about the “table crumbs” offered to them in the Google book settlement. But unless they take action similar to what I’ve described here, those rights may be the best that public libraries can hope for as the e-book market expands.
Copyright and Technology 2011 Conference Recap December 1, 2011
Posted by Bill Rosenblatt in Events.5 comments
Thanks to all who spoke, moderated, sponsored, publicized, helped out at, and attended Wednesday’s Copyright and Technology conference. Judging by attendance alone, the event was a success with over 25% higher attendance than last year’s event.
I was too busy running around making sure the show went smoothly to pay as much attention to the panels as I would have liked — and given that we had two parallel tracks going for much of the day, it would have been physically impossible anyway. I invite attendees to comment here on their impressions. You can also search Twitter for hashtag #ct2011 to see what attendees thought in real time.
For me, there were a few particularly memorable moments. One was the keynote address by Tom Rubin, Chief Counsel for Intellectual Property Strategy at Microsoft. I invited Tom because of his record of consistent, intelligent advocacy of an approach to copyright in the digital age that balances the need for unimpeded technological innovation with respect for intellectual property.
His talk “Copyright at the Speed of Light: Creative Content and Cloud Computing” did not disappoint. The main takeaway for me was Tom’s expression of the urgent need for global registries of content and rights, to ensure that commerce in legitimate content over the Internet can flow seamlessly across international boundaries. We didn’t have a panel on rights registries (The Future of Music Coalition’s Policy Summit back in October did), but this topic is getting much attention nowadays with the Book Rights Registry contemplated in the Google book settlement, the Global Repertory Database project, the WIPO International Music Registry project, and other efforts.
The other fascinating point for me was the panel on cutting-edge legal issues in the music industry, the last panel on the Law and Policy track. Hillel Parness, a litigator and adjunct professor at Columbia Law School, gave a rapid (in fact head-spinningly fast) tour of court decisions in the past that had to consider copyright issues with online services. These took place long enough ago that their judges’ bases of comparison were brick-and-mortar entities such as libraries and newsstands. Many of these older decisions said, in effect, that the Internet really is different: its scale and speed make it impossible for Internet service providers to examine every bit of content for such things as copyright violations.
Yet more recently, courts have decided cases involving services that do have just that ability (at least to some extent), and the areas of dispute have turned to whether or not the relevant technologies are being applied in ways that suit copyright owners or are effective enough. In other words, it seems as though technology has advanced since, say, the mid-1990s so that the Internet is not so different after all — at least from this legal perspective.
In some cases, a service provider can claim safe harbor (i.e., “I’m not liable”) because it does not implement any controls (or as a reason why it doesn’t implement them); in other cases, a service provider may be potentially liable because of the behavior of the controls it does implement.
When I asked the panelists whether this apparent “chicken and egg” issue sends mixed messages to service providers who are thinking of using, say, watermarking or fingerprinting technology to catch infringers, they said that it depends on how lawyers choose to interpret these decisions. This is another way of saying that the relationships between rights technologies and copyright liability will remain ambiguous for the foreseeable future – thereby keeping lawyers like those panelists (not to mention consultants like myself) very busy for the rest of their careers.
Finally, the panel I moderated on content security challenges in multi-platform distribution revealed some of the Hollywood studios’ thinking on this topic. Ron Wheeler, the head of content protection in Fox’s legal department, confirmed what many of us have thought to be the case: Hollywood has seen what happens when a single downstream entity achieves a market share large enough to dominate the economic terms — that is, Apple in music. And Hollywood is doing all it can to prevent a similar fate for film content by encouraging healthy competition in the video distribution space.
The UltraViolet standard is their way of lessening certain types of advantages that one online retailer can have over another, such as the ability to lock consumers into their systems; the scheme’s emphasis on interoperability potentially benefits consumers as well by giving them more choices of retailers, device types, and even delivery modalities (physical products, downloads, and streaming).
However, Wheeler revealed that the different Hollywood studios have varying degrees of enthusiasm for UltraViolet. The most bullish is Warner Bros., which has released some titles on Blu-ray bundled with UltraViolet “rights tokens” that enable buyers to get their movies as downloads or stream them, through a retailer called Flixster that Warner itself owns. Yet Wheeler said “We don’t expect Flixster to be the next Wal-Mart,” while adding that Fox is supportive of UltraViolet. (The least enthusiastic studio is Disney, which is not a member of UltraViolet at all and apparently is still talking about its “rival” scheme, KeyChest.)
My opening remarks, which set the stage for the conference by teeing up the issues to be discussed, are available on the conference page. Other presentations from the conference, as well as video highlights, will be posted on the conference page as we get them.
European High Court Says No to ISP-Level Copyright Filtering November 28, 2011
Posted by Bill Rosenblatt in Europe, Fingerprinting, Law, Music, Services.add a comment
Last Thursday the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that ISPs cannot be held responsible for filtering traffic on their networks in order to catch copyright infringements. This ruling was the final step in the journey of the litigation between the Belgian music rights collecting society SABAM and the ISP Scarlet, but it is a landmark decision for all of Europe.
This ruling overturned the Belgian Court of First Instance, which four years ago required Scarlet to install filtering technology such as acoustic fingerprinting to monitor Internet traffic and block uploads of copyrighted material to the network. Scarlet appealed this decision to the Brussels Court of Appeals, which sought guidance from the ECJ.
The ECJ’s statement affirmed copyright holders’ rights to seek injunctions from ISPs like Scarlet to prevent copyright infringement, but it said that the Belgian court’s injunction requiring ISP-level copyright filtering went too far. It cited Article 3 of European Union Directive 2004/48, which states that “measures, procedures and remedies [for enforcing intellectual property rights] shall be fair and equitable, shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly and not impose unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays.” The ECJ decided that the mechanism defined in the appeals court’s ruling did not meet these criteria.
The real issues here are the requirement that the ISP bear the cost and complexity of running the filtering technology, and the fact that running it would slow down the network for all ISP users. It’s easy to see how this would not meet the requirements in the above EU Directive.
This decision has direct applicability in the European Union, but its implications could reach further afield. For example, the issue currently being argued between Viacom and Google at the appeals court level in the United States boils down to the same thing: whose bears the cost and responsibilty to police copyrights on the Internet?
Of course, EU law doesn’t apply in the United States. In the Viacom/Google litigation, Google is relying on the “notice and takedown” portion of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), a/k/a section 512 of the US copyright law. This says that if a copyright holder (e.g., Viacom) sees one of its works online without its authorization, it can issue a notice to the network service provider to take the work down, and if it does so, it won’t be liable for infringement. Google’s argument is that it follows section 512 assiduously and therefore should not be liable.
Viacom’s task in this litigation is to convince the court that the DMCA doesn’t go far enough. More specifically, its argument is that the legislative intent behind the DMCA is not served well enough by the notice-and-takedown provisions, that network service providers should be required to take more proactive responsibility for policing copyrights on their services instead of requiring copyright owners to play the Whack-a-Mole game of notice and takedown.
The ECJ’s decsion in SABAM v. Scarlet has no precedential weight in Viacom v. Google. But it may help get the Third Circuit Appeals Court to focus on what Jonathan Zittrain of Harvard Law School has called the “gravamen” (which is legalese for “MacGuffin“) in this case: who should be paying for protecting copyrights.

